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7
PRINCIPLE, POLITICS, PROFESSION
American sociologists and fascism, 1930-1950
Robert C. Bannister

THE PROBLEM

'For the two years from '38 to '40, I never discussed democracy or Nazism,'
the sociologist William F. Ogburn confided to his diary once the war was
over. Although he had broken this silence briefly during 1941, his lectures
were 'wholly analytical', he continued. 'I knew .. . that Lo refer to Hitler
without at the same time calling him a son-of-a-bitch, was to be classed as
pro-Nazi. But we were not at war, and I have never been much concerned
with what people thought of me.• Nor did the outbreak of hostilities shake
this resolve. 'When the war came on I never made any speeches referring
in any way to Nazism or democracy.' When in his classroom he occasionally
discussed democracy, he approached the subject as one might the 'mores
of the Eskimo'. 'The classes,' he observed, 'were sometimes resentful,
sometimes quiet, sometimes, maybe, sullen.' 1
During the interwar years, Ogburn's was a voice that counted in
American sociology. During the 1920s, most of the prewar founders had
passed from the scene: Albion Small of Chicago (died 1926), Charle
Horton Cooley of Michigan (1929), and Frank1in Giddings of Columbia
(1931). Remaining founders included Charles Ellwood of Duke and
Edward A. Ross of Wisconsin, both secondary powers in the profession. A
third was W.I. Thoma , whose use of the 'case study' in The Polish Peasant
(1918) provided a model for one brand of Chicago sociology but whose
prestige declined after his dismissal from the University of Chicago on a
bogus morals charge in 1918.
In their place appeared new con tenders for profcs ion al power and
prestige. During the 1920s, the urban sociologist Robert Park and his
students made the 'Chicago school' virtually synonymous with American
sociology. At the University of North Carolina, Howard W. Odum (Ph.D.
Columbia, l 909) launched the discipline's first formal research institute
and published Social Forces, the first new sociological journal in the United
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States since the founding of the American journal of Sociol.ogy (1895). At the
University of Southern California Emory S. Bogardus established a West
Coast enclave and a second new journal, Sociowgy and Social Research. With
W.F. Ogbum's election to the presidency of the American Sociological
Society in 1929, this 'second' generation effectively came to power within
the profession.
Ogburn's program, as outlined in his presidential address to the ASS,
called for a rigorously quantitative sociology, preferably based on statistics.
Alternately termed 'neo-positivists', 'objectivists', or (more derisively)
proponents of 'scientism', sociologists of this persuasion held, not only that
science provided mankind with an all-embracing philo ophy oflife and the
solution to all problems, but that the techniques used in the physical
sciences could be used Lo solve any problem (Hayek 1954: 1).
During the 1930s, these objectivists, in turn, divided into two loose
factions. one led by Ogburn and his allies (including Stuart Rice of the
University of Pennsylvania) and the other by Luther Lee Bernard, a
maverick whose peripatetic career finally brought him to Washington
University in St Louis. 2 For Ogburn, a scientific sociology was nominalist,
statistical, and advisory, that is, it was concerned with means rather than
ends. For Bernard it was realist and presumptively radical in that it provided
an 'objective standard of social control', and hence absolute standards for
social reconstruction. During the early 1940s, objectivist sociology reached
a peak of sorts with the successive appointment of two leading proponents
of value-neutral cientism to the editorship of the Amelican Sociologi.cal
Review (Read Bain of Miami University in Ohio; F. Stuart Chapin, University
of Minnesota), and of a third (George Lundberg of Bennington College)
to the presidency of the American Sociological Society for 1943.
Although the lines separating the objectivist factions sometimes blurred,
they collectively differed in minor but significant ways from non-objectivist
colleagues in background and politic . Socially marginal, they represented
the more provincial reaches of a fast-modernizing America: the rural south
(Ogburn), the southwest (Bernard), and the upper Great Plains
(Lundberg). Educated almost exclusively in the United States, they had
fewer contacts and less interest in Europe than did the prewar founders and
many of their own more cosmopolitan contemporaries. Although Ogburn
and his associates achieved success in the university and foundation worlds,
Bernard and many of his allies toiled at provincial institutions of the second
or third rank. While these circumstances inclined many to a sort of populist
radicalism on domestic issues, and to dissent within the profession, they
also made them prime candidates for po t-First World War disillusionment
and isolationism in international affairs.
Since sociological theory and professional prestige were intertwined,
question concerning American sociology's response to fascism must be
asked at the levels of principle, politics, and profession. To the extent that
173

SOCIOLOGY RESPONDS TO FASCISM

the re ponse was muted or superficial (as Ogburn's comments suggest),
did the fault lie in sociological theory, political conviction, or some
combination? What role if any was played by the internal dynamics of
professionalism, a question particularly relevant given sociology's
perennial instability? What effect did the emergence of fascism have on the
shape of the discipline? It is these questions that this paper will explore.
Historiography

Although historians of sociology have addressed these issues only
tangentially, earlier debates provide a focus for this discussion. An
overarching question has been whether fascism was rooted in religious,
idealist, or romantic thought, or in the tradition of positivism dating from
Auguste Comte. Defending the first view, a British pro-fascist argued that
sociology provided no basis for social policy precisely because it was
narrowly posiLivisLic. Italian fascism, in contrast, provided Lhe missing
moral guide because it was rooted in religion and tradition. Enemies of
fascism reversed this judgement while accepting its premise. So viewed,
fascism marked a resurgence of the forces of traditionalism, authoritarianism, and various forms of irrationalism (Barnes 1928; Ellwood 1938:
289).
In this interpretation, sociologists who set the stage were Vilfredo Pareto
('the Karl Marx of Fascism'); Ludwig Cumplowicz and others of the
Austrian 'struggle school'; and a potpourri of racialists, nationalists, and
eugenists now branded 'social Darwinist' (McGovern 1941; Hofstadter
1944). 3
Others added that Comte, Durkheim, and Tonnies must also shoulder
blame, a charge later commonplace so far as concerned Tonnies. Despite
their embrace of science, each of these sociologists allegedly harboured
secret affection for an organic order characterized alternatively as
theowgical (Comte), as Gemeinschaft (Tonnies), and as mechanic solidarity
(Durkheim) (Ranulf 1939: 16-34).
Other critics meanwhile rooted fascism in positivism itself. Within
American sociology, this charge fuelled the ongoing battle between
Ogburn 's rigorously scientistic faction and Bernard's loose coalition of
social evolutionists, reformers, and others increasingly marginalized within
the profession. 'If fascism comes, I surmi e that [some of the sheltered
sociologists who are commanding the strategic positions within the
academic world] might be willing to surrender their birthright for a mess
of pottage,' one of Bernard's allies wrote him in 1938. 'AL the present, some
of them for the lack of vision, are drifting into the intellectual desert of
Logical Positivism where they wilJ be brooding upon their empty eggs of
thought. ' 4 In Reason and Revolution (1941), the emigre philosopher Herbert
Marcuse argued that positivism, in separating sociology from philosophy,
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narrowed the former to the study of immediate experience while exempting from critical reason wider realms of experience which Comte
proceeded to fill with the elaborate rituals and symbols of his Religion of
Humanity. Positivism thus provided a defence of middle-class society, while
bearing within itself 'the seeds of a philosophic justification of
authoritarianism' (Marcuse 1941: 340-43). An American critic, charging
Lundberg with pro-fa cist views, turned Marcuse's argument against
'operationalism ', the latest attenuation of the extreme positivist spirit
(Hartung 1944: 330, 335, 337, 340-41). 5
Summary of argument

On balance, the following account supports the second rather than the first
of the e interpretations, although in i ting that national, international, and
profes ional politics were inextricably bound up with a positivi tic
orientation. In American sociology's response to fascism, principle,
politics, and profes ion each played a part
Some American ociologi t early developed a dista te for fascism. But
tho who spoke out again t the new movements in Italy and Germany
laboured under a dual disadvantage. At the level of theory, their passion
was often d eper than their analysis, as they viewed fascism rather narrowly
in terms of clas struggle or as the logic of capitalism, both legacies of the
dom tic political battles of the prewar Progressive Era. 6 Despite ome
truth, these analyses were more revealing of the concerns of left-of-centre
American liberals or radical than of the complex nature of fasci m. Nor,
from a later perspective, were they really sociological.'
Within the profes ion, the mo t outspoken anti-fasci ts al o lacked clout.
Although the four leading sociological journals gave ome space to
discussions of fa cism, and regularly reviewed books on the subject,8
authors and reviewers were typically relative unknowns (often without
Ph.Ds), European emigres (and hence also outsiders), or in fields other
than sociology. Often right for the wrong reasons, they were ea y to ignore.
Al the other extreme, Ogburn's studied silence, if notable in its frankness, was not unique among the profes ion's leaders. During Mussolini's
rise to power surprisingly few sociological big hots mentioned Italian
fascism, while even fewer criticized it. From the triumph of National
Socialism in 1933 through the Nazi-Soviet pact six years later, an amalgam
of value-free objectivism, political isolationism, and veiled anti- emitism
k pt public discussion to a minimum. Privately, younger objectivists
speculated that a social scienti t as cientist could function as effectively in
Hitler' Germany as in Franklin Roosevelt's America. In his presidential
addre to the ASS in 1943, George Lundberg seemed to some to verge on
open anti- emiti m, while his other public statement· appeared to
repudiate democracy.
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During the early 1940s, a gradual recognition of the complex nature of
German fascism transformed the debate - due in part to new perspectives
drawn from earlier European sociology, and in part to growing recognition
of the true meaning of Hitler's attack on the Jews. In the end, the debate
over fascism worked to the disadvantage of both versions of objectivism,
most especially the narrowly positivistic faction represented first by
Ogburn, then by Lundberg. The beneficiaries, however, were not the
reformers and dissidents of the 1930s, but a new generation who proposed
to bring American sociology more squarely within the European tradition.
Chief among these was Talcott Parsons, whose analysis of fascism in the
early 1940s moved the debate to a new level, while directing American
sociology along a new path. Just as the First World War had hastened the
demise of a reformi t social evolutionism and brought the rise of
value-neutral scientism, so the events of the Second World War paved the
way for the emergence of the Parsonian paradigm within the discipline.
In considering these issues, 'response' must be interpreted within an
American context. Unlike their Italian or German colleagues, American
sociologists faced no momentous decision to support or to oppose regimes
that demanded their loyalty. Rather they enjoyed the luxury of a
wait-and-see attitude throughout most of the 1930s. Once war was declared,
theoretical discussions of the nature and sources of fascism were
subordinated to more general issues concerning America's war effort and,
later, to the postwar reconstruction of Germany. Nor were sociologists
alone in responding too little and too late, as the historian John Diggins has
shown in his exhaustive study of American reactions to Mus olini (Diggins
1972). No American sociologist here considered was openly pro-fascist, as
was the case with certain Italian and German social scientists. 9 Rather, the
case was one of collective myopia in the face of distinctly modern
developments that cast a shadow not only on human history but on the very
concept of modernity. 10
ANTI-FASCIST VOICES
Charles A. EJlwood
During the 1920s, the professionalization of American sociology translated
in practice into close, empirical study of domestic issues rather than
comparative or historical studies of social systems or ideologies. The result
was evident in the response to international affairs. Despite their important
contributions to urban ecology and regionalism, for example, neither
Robert Park nor Howard Odum apparently studied or commented on the
rise of Mussolini or Gennan fascism. 11 The task of speaking out instead fell
initially to two men trained in the prewar years: Charles A. Ellwood, an early
Chicago Ph.D. (1899) who continued to represent the religious, reformist
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impulse of prewar sociology; and Emory S. Bogardus, also a Chicago Ph.D.
(1911), whose 'social distance' scale won him a minor reputation during
the 1920s.
Born in upstate New York, Ellwood (1873-1946) began his career as a
charity worker b fore teaching at the universities of Nebraska and Missouri,
and finally Duke (appointed 1929). Convinced that the First World War was
the product of unbridled materialism, he launched a one-man cru ·ade for
spirituality in scholarship against all forms of 'objectivism', a term he first
used in 1916. In the early l 920s he fought (and lost) battles against military
conscription, immigration restriction, and the racism that was endemic in
his adopted state of Missouri.
Ellwood early observed fascism firsthand during a visit to Italy in
1927-28. 'Perhaps the three and one half months which I spent [there]
were the most stimulating of the nine and one half months which I spent
on the continent of Europe,' he wrote in an unpublished sketch of his
career a year later. Although he had once believed that social evolution
guaranteed the triumph of democracy, he was now less sure. 'I now see that
the Democratic Movement is not certain of victory in our culture,' he
continued, 't10les strong efforts are made in the direction of social and
political education.' 12
From the late 1920s onward, Ellwood warned audiences throughout the
nation of fascism's perils. 'Never before has democracy in all its forms been
challenged so boldly, so determinedly, and so logically as by the fascist
regime in Italy,' he observed in a public lecture at Vanderbilt. 'Fascism is
doomed before it starts because it is built on false doctrines of social
theory,' he added before another audience at Northwestern. 'Even if
fascism is well integrated within the nation - and notice I am not saying that
it is - but even if it is, it is headed for disaster, because it leads inevitably to
war.'" Although Ellwood contributed little or nothing in the way of formal
analy is in these lectures or in his published work, the menace of fascism
also echoed through his escalating attack on sociological objectivism (an
'emasculated sociology', he termed it), and surfaced again in Th.P Stary of
Social Philosophy ( 1939). 'Hegel ... lives again,' he wrote of the roots of
Nazism, 'in the ''Authoritarian Volk State" that Hitler and his followers have
set up.· Writing to prai e E.A. Ross's New Age Sociowgy the following year, he
added: 'The trend at the moment, as you know, is so strongly for fascism,
and possibly even toward a totalitarian form of the state, that our youth
need to have their faith re-awakened in the social and political principles
which lie at the foundation of our republic.' 14
By the 1930s, however, Ellwood's frank religiosity and armchair
theorizing branded him as a voice of sociology-past, while a diminutive
stature, a nervou manner, and a tendency to appropriate the theories of
others mad him an easy target for ridicule among younger colleagues. At
the University of Missouri years before, the students called him 'Little
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Charlie' behind his back. During lecrures, Bernard recalled of his former
professor, Ellwood had a habit of shmgging his shoulders as if to 'worm
out' of a jacket always too big for him, and had an 'annoying habit' of
'sucking air or saliva through his teeth with a characteristic sound, possibly
because his lips were too big for his Irish type mouth'. At the University of
Chicago, Bernard added, sociologists resisted inviting Ellwood to their
seminars for fear he would publish their ideas before they did (Bannister
1987: 115-16, 134-35, 192-94). When in 1935 Ellwood was elected
president of the soon-controver ial International Federation of Sociology,
one of Bernard's allies branded the election 'utterly preposterous' _1 5
However estimable his attacks on fascism, and prescient hi prediction
concerning war, Ellwood's warnings were unlikely to have much impact on
his fellow-sociologists.

Sociology and Social Research
Born in rural Illinois, Emory S. Bogardus (1882-1973), like Ellwood, was
heir to the religious/reform spirit of the early century. While upportive
parents urged education, a local pastor inculcated a sense of 'universal
values and humanity-wide needs', he wrote of his early life. After
graduating from Northwestern University (BA 1908, MA 1909), he received
a Ph.D. at Chicago for a thesis on 'The Relation of Fatigue to Indu trial
Accidents'. To finance his studies, he worked at the Northwestern Univer ity Settlement on Chicago's North Side, where he developed a lifelong
inter st in the relations of different immigrant groups. During his long
career at USC (1911-1946), he published some 275 articles, most on theory
and group relations, although twelve (as he counted them) in the area of
'world community and organization'. In creating the 'social distance
scale' ; 6 Bogardus contributed to the 1920s passion for quantification. But,
unlike the more extreme quantifiers, he continued to insi t that ociology
must erve democracy and social welfare. 17
Bogardus, accordingly, opened the pages of Sociowgy and Soci.al Research
to discussions of fascism and international affairs. Typically brief, rarely
penetrating, these ontributions nonetheless championed democracy
against both fascist and Communi t alternatives. 'As a means, fascism may
be good,' Bogardus concluded an assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of Mussolini's programme in 1933; 'but it contains the seeds
of its own destruction in its autocracy.' The platform of Hitler's
movement, a second commentator warned the same year, 'reveal the
party's inbred anti-Semitic stand' (Bogardus 1933: 569-74; Mohme 1933:
409-15; Yankwich 1934: 365-71). National Socialism was not ociali m
despite its name, insisted John E. Nordskog, a colleague of Bogardus whose
training had included studies at the London School of Economics. In a
column of 'International Notes', Nordskog also informed readers of the
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latest European developments, while in book reviews drew attention to
work critical of fascism, among them John F. Holt's Under the Swastika
(1936) and Gaetano Salvemini's UndertheAxeofFascism (1939) (Nordskog
1939; 1937a; 1937b).
Sociology and Social lwearch thus reinforced Ellwood's warnings. But
Bogardus faced similar problems impressing the sociological community
with the urgency of the situation. Nol only were West Coast institutions still
relatively isolated, but he per onally enjoyed little prestige among his
eastern colleagues, indeed was 'very much disliked', as Bernard put it to
Read Bain, explaining why a plan to make Soriology and Social &search one
of three 'official' journals of the ASS was doomed to fail. 18 Although elected
president of the Society for 1931, Bogardus played little role in its affairs
during the decade. More importantly, as was also the case with Bernard and
his allie , the contributors to Sociology and Social Research, despite their
defences of democracy, often made curious concessions in the attempt to
balance pros and cons of fascism. Although anti-Semitism was excessive,
continued the author of the article cited above, 'a racial problem does
exi t'. Even Hitler's 'frequently Nordic extravaganzas', he concluded, 'may
be viewed as moral regeneration' (Mohme 1933: 411,415). In Bogardus's
own analy i , and in others, admiration for fasci t planning showed
through the criticism (Bogardus 1933; Wilson 1936). Although discussions
of fascism appeared sporadically into the 1940s, they were light in both
volume and ubstance when compared with growing interest in the topic in
the profession generally.
The ASS rebels

During the l 930s, younger activists within the American Sociological
Society added their voices to tho e of Ellwood and Bogardus. 19 At their
centre stood the irascible Luther Bernard, elected president of the ASS for
1932. Others included Jerome Davi ·, soon to be dismissed from Yale in what
became a minor cause cilibre, and Maurice Parmelee, a sometime sociologist
and government economist, who in 1931 led the first of a series of battles
to reform the ASS. 20
Jerome Davis (1891-1979) led off in Contemporary Social Movements
( 1930), a superficial and in many ways unsatisfactory effort that is
important only because it wa one of the first attempts by an American
sociologist Lo elucidate fascist theory. For Davis, opposition to fasci m was a
natural extension of a lifelong crusade against bad things. Born in Japan,
the on of missionary parents, he returned to the United States at age
thirteen only to discover a great many things to disapprove, starting with
the 'sexual smut and profanity [and] ... the ostentatious display of wealth'
at the posh private school he attended in Washington D.C. (run by his
uncle), and continuing at Columbia graduate school (Ph.D. 1922) with the
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'social ignorance and stupidity' that produced the 3-Ds (dependants,
defectives, and delinquents) .21
In 1917 Davis made the first of several trips to Russia where he observed
the Revolution firsthand, an experience that provided him with a model of
the good society, a topic for a doctoral dissertation, and material for several
books. During the 1920s, Davis's radicalism was a source of unending
academic difficulties. In 1922 several New Hampshire manufacturers
demanded that he be fired from Dartmouth the year he arrived because of
a study ofa strike in a Manchester factory. In 1925, Davis's sympathy for the
revisionism of Harry Elmer Barnes and Sidney B. Fay brought a warning
from Yale President James R. Angell, and possibly cost him a Guggenheim
Fellowship. In 1927, following a trip to the Soviet Union, the charge was
that Davis had taken 'Moscow Gold' in connection with a series of books h
was editing for Vanguard Press. 22
For self-protection if nothing else, Davis increasingly wrapped his social
concerns in a rhetorical mantle of science and quantification. Increasingly,
he was 'convinced that sociology must rely on the statistical method to a
greater extent than before'. His best-known work, An Introduction to
Sociology (1927), was subtitled 'A Behavioristic Study of American Society'
(Davis 1927). 23 Although Davis's publications were numerous, they were
the sort that the new professionals increasingly dismissed: studies oflabour,
the church, immigration and related social problems; readers and
textbooks. By 1932, he had published almost a dozen books, but as a Yale
dean was later unkind enough to point out, many were written with other
or loaded with source material. 24
Contemporary Sod.al Movements was an uneasy compromise between
Davis's convictions and the demands of classroom teaching. A collection of
readings strung together by his own prose, it devoted only a hundred of its
900 pages to fascism, with the bulk given to Communism, socialism, and the
British labour movement. Dealing entirely with Italy (since Hiller's rise to
power was three years in the future), the fascist section consisted largely of
selections from participants favourable to the movement, capped by a
dissent from Davis in the form ofa recitation of instances offascism within
the United States: from statements by defenders of American capitalism to
the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. For analysis, Davis fell back on the
conventional wisdom of the left: 'Fascism is a bulwark of capitalism'.
Although he remained hopeful that American traditions of free speech and
popular education would safeguard the nation against the fascist menace,
he predicted that political power-holders, if sufficiently threatened by
opponents of private property, 'would find the use of violence a natural
and easy step' (Davis 1930: 518,521).
Most reviewers focused more on Davis's treatment of Bolshevism than of
fascism. The hostile ones faulted his bias, while the favourable ones denied
it 'Rather strained efforts are made,' one reviewer noted, 'to link up each
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movement wilh American condilions and interests.' Another pronounced
the work of 'que tionable' value both scientifically and pedagogically. A
third, in contrast, wished that Congressmen investigating 'red' activity
could have used the text in college. In all three, professional and national
politics tinged concern with fascism per se, since the first two were written by
professors at Yale's arch-rival Harvard, and the third by an Ohio State
sociologist soon lo be fired for radical activity (Elliott 1931; Sorokin 1931;
Miller 1931).
A second ASS dissident to discus fascism was Maurice Parmelee
(1882-1969) in his Bolsheuism, Fascism, and Liberal Democratic Stales (1934).
Born in Istanbul, the son of Congregalionalist missionaries, Parmelee like
Davis was a birthright rebel, inheriting his parents' zeal if not their religious
faith. After graduating from Yale ( 1904), he received a doctorate in
sociology at Columbia (1909), then taught briefly at the universities of
Kan as, Missouri, Minne ota and finally the City College of New York. In
1918 he accepted a job with the War Trade Board in London, effectively
leaving academic life for good, allhough not for want of trying to return.
During the 1930s, he won brief notoriety as a member of the rebel faction
that attempted to 'democratize' the ASS, but otherwise remained on the
fringes of his discipline. Before retiring from the Railroad Retirement
Board in 1952, he spent lhe rest of his career as an economist for various
governmental agencies. 25
A man of wide interests and many causes, Parmelee wrote prolifically on
subjects that ranged from criminology (his speciality) to 'scientific'
sociology (hi passion) to nudism (his favorite avocation). Other books
included studies of sea power, oriental culture, poverty, and even modern
marriage, although he remained a bachelor throughout his life. While
Criminowgy ( 1918) and related work won him a minor reputation within
sociology, The New Gymnosophy (1927), a study of nudism, and Bolshevism,
Fascism and the Liberal Democratic Stale brought him notoriety and
near-disaster when Congressman Martin Dies in the early 1940s managed
to have him fired from his post with the Board of Economic Warfare for
espousing nudism and Communism ('Dies in the Spring' 1942).
An invet rate traveller, Parmelee observed the ri e ofltalian fascism and
National Socialism at first hand. In 1920, he returned to Germany to study
economic conditions for Lhe State Department, remaining in Berlin until
the spring of 1923. During 1928-29 he travelled for a year in the Soviet
Union and through Italy to ob erve Bolshevism and fascism. During the
summer of 1933 he was back in Germany to witness the results of the Nazi
takeover. Among American sociologists, Parmelee was thus uniquely
privileged to comment on fasci m.
The fact that he finally had little more impact than Ellwood or Davis is
thus e pecially instructive. Although Parmelee's Yale education and wide
international experience distinguished him from most objectivists, he
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shared Lheir desire to make sociology more 'scienlific', albeil more
'liberal', as he once explained to Bernard. In practice, this programme
translated into a prevailing animus against social workers, rural sociologists, and olher 'meliorists' (his favourite pejorative). This animus
extended to European sociologists, particularly when they threatened to
siphon foundation funds from American sociologists, among them
Parmelee, who perennially sought such grants. 'Last winter it occurred to
me that if these foundations would spend this money [given to European
researchers] in America, the problem of the unemployed American social
scicn tis ts could readily be solved,' he wrote to Bernard in 1933, explaining
a plan to persuade the Rockefellers and others to buy American. 26
Unfortunately, Bolshevism, Fascism., like most of Parmelee's work, was
bold in scope, rich in detail, but rather short on critical analysis and
systematic research. Both Italian fascism and National Socialism, as
expressions of nationalism, had roots in history, he argued, the first 'in
imperial Rome, the medieval city state, and the Catholic Church', the
second in the 'traditions of the ancient Teutons'. Although appealing to
various groups in early stages, both were finally expressions of
'monopolistic capitalism'. Without denying the extreme denial of civil
liberties and individual rights under these regimes, he insisted that
liberal-democracy under capitalism 'had al ·o resulted in destroying in large
part the civil liberties'. Although National Socialism was a 'close variant of
fascism', both differed markedly from Bolshevism, despite contemporary
opinion to the contrary (Parmelee 1934: 193, 7,195,362,293).
Although one of Parmelee's defenders later described his book as a
'vigorous attack on bolshevism and fascism and a paean for the liberal
democratic state' (Gibbons 1974: 407), its emphasis on fascism-asmonopoly-capitalism, as with Davis's analysis, marked it as a product of
American left-of-centre liberalism. To be sure, Parmelee pulled few
punches. Although stressing the pragmatism in Mussolini's philosophy, his
characterizations of this strain as 'opportunism' made it clear that he had
little sympathy with il. His description of Nazi book-burning and antiSemitism were detailed and forthright.
On balance, however, Parmelee added little to current debate. Less
extreme but also less reasoned than contemporary analyses along similar
lines (for example, R. Palme Dutt's Fascism and Social Reuolulion [1934]), his
view of fascism as an expression of capitalist interests, and as an
authoritarian response to the problems of liberal democracy, was by now
the standard line ofleflist writers, many of whom Parmelee read and cited.
Indeed, as one reviewer noted, Parmelee tended to report on published
sources rather than provide 'his first hand reactions to what he actually saw'
('Review' 1935a: 499). Hi view of Communism, written while New Deal
policies seemed to be foundering and before Stalin's purges were under
way, expressed the sort of sympathetic optimism many American
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intellectuals still harboured toward the Soviet experiment. His prognosis
for capitalism was accordingly gloomy. 'This is a vain hope for them', he
concluded ofrecent attempts at economic planning in capitalistic societies.
'Planning is wholly inconsistent with and impossible under capitalism'
(Parmelee I 934: 418).
Although Parmelee's book was more widely reviewed than Davis's
Contemporary SorialMovements, the reviews suggested why he was even easier
to dismiss. The North American Review thought his chapters on Italian fascism
'especially interesting' because they exposed the economic realities behind
the 'bold, showy, and wonderfully well publicized Italian front'. But the
reviewer also cautioned readers that Parmelee must be 'read with care'
because he 'does not always think as clearly as he might'. The Saturday
Review of Literature wondered where Parmelee himself stood politically. If
not capitalism or socialism, then what? Perhaps 'technocracy', the reviewer
opined. But like most supporters of technocracy, Parmelee dodged the
question of what political and ocial objectives would guide the technocrats
- a charge similar to that often levelled against most proponents of a more
trictly scientific sociology and social policy ('Review' 1935b: 92; 'Review'
1935a: 499) .
Nor did Parmelce's position in tl1e profession redeem these shortcomings. He was 'a mo t insignificant looking person' who 'never achieved
any standing', one contemporary recalled. He was not a very 'conspicuous'
figure, added another, and 'was generally looked on as a mediocre scholar'.
For whatever reasons, his colleagues in sociology virtually ignored his
analysis of fascism.just as most would later fail to support him during the
Dies investigation (comments quoted by Gibbons 1974: 413).
Luther L. Bernard

Although Luther Bernard (1881-1951) published less than his fellow
dissidellls on the subject, he was perhaps the most adamant in private in
opposing all tendencies of 'fascism' whether at home, abroad, or within his
own profession. Born in Kentucky, raised in the bleaker parts of west Texas
and southwest Mis ouri, Bernard was one of sociology's most complex
figures - personally, intellectually, and politically. After attending an
obscure Baptist college in Mis ouri, he received a doctorate in sociology
under Albion Small at Chicago, in the process breaking from his mentor
and offending most of the faculty. Partly as con quence, he became one
of the profession's most peripatetic practitioners, teaching finally at half a
dozen univer ities before an unwilling retirement from Washington
University in St Louis in the mid 1940s.
During his graduate school days, Bernard considered himself an
· intelligent liberal', that is to say, one who favoured a social policy based on
science rather than on sentimenL During a summer on the Chautauqua
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lecture circuit in 1909, he opposed socialists, reactionaries, and do-good
sentimentalists alike. 27 His goal was 'an objective standard of social control',
the title of his dissertation. But Bernard's politics, like those of Parmelee,
could be omewhat confusing. Like other ocial controllers, including
many who supported Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive (Bull Moose) Party
in 1912, he mingled praise of democracy with calls for an 'objective
standard' that seemed to denigrate democratic politics. During the 1930s,
Bernard was a political enigma - an amalgam of populist instincts, an elitist
faith in efficiency, and a distrust of the two major parties. In 1932, he urged
two former Bull Moosers to run on a third-party platform of 'constitutionalism, agrarian defen e, and the welfare of the workers and the
unemployed'. 28 In one unpublished attack on then-President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, he charged that the New Deal's chief beneficiaries were
'speculative business', 'speculative overcapitalized railroads', 'credit
speculators and professional stock waterers'. F.D.R. hims If wa 'the face
debonair and the ingratiating radio voice'; the 'hero of the Hudson'; and
'nin ·ty percent Eleanor [the President's wife] and ten percent mush'. 29
Then and later, however, the politic of Bernard's own utopia of perfect
adjustment remained regrettably vague.
From this uncertain persp ctivc, Bernard monitored the rise of Nazi m
with growing concern. Unlike ome champions of ocial control, he
r jccted the argument that a Hitler or Mu olini could provide order and
stability superior to that in the democratic ocieties. uch tability was
'illusory', and indeed de tructive of the 'most valuable elements in our
society', Bernard observed in the ·pring of 1935 when a member of the
audience at one of his lectures made thi argument. The coming of the
dictatorships was but 'a last de ·perate attempt to hold a decaying civilization together a little longer'. Confronting a group of Germans while
returning from Europe that fall, he chided them for not overthrowing
Hitler. A year later, more apprehensively, h asked fellow sociologist
Charle Ellwood whether the older man thought that fascism was 'going to
oyerrun the world'.'°
Tutored by his wife Jes ie, Bernard acquainted himself with the growing
literature on fascism in preparation for hi· forthcoming study of Social
Control (1939). In the autumn of 1936Je·sie reported onJohn Strachey's
The Menace of Fascism ( 1933), a left-wing attack widely criticized by
American reviewers as being pro-Communi ·t. After reading Stephen H.
Roberts' The House that Hill.er Built ( 1937) and another work by a 'British
journalist', Jessie commented on the power of German propaganda, a
theme of special intere t to social control ociologi ts. Shortly after
Munich, Luther himself condemned the 'effete dcmocra ie ' of Europe
for not calling Hitler's bluff. '[War] would have been the best thing,· he
wrote to Jessie, 'war now - for it will certainly be war in earnest in a few
years, after Hitler ha fully armed, and after Fr. and Eng. are ruined by
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armament races. Only Russia, Germany, and Italy will survive (in Europe)
this cowardly policy. ' 31
In Social Contro~ Bernard cited examples of terrorization and
regimentation under the Nazi regime. His bibliography provided a full
listing of recent treatments of fascism. In War and its Causes (1944), an
encyclopedic survey of the nature and future of war as a social in titution,
he castigated the Nazis' sneak attack on other nations, their plundering of
wealth from other countries, and their 'unsound racial ideology'. Although
German nationalism was a minor motivation in Nazism, the appeal to
pan-German entiments was 'a convenient working camouflage' of motives
that included 'the de ire of Hitler personally to play a hero role in world
affairs, ... of the capitali tic interests in the state to e tablish economic
imperialism over the world, of the military clique to regain their lost
professional prestige, and of the masses of the German people to have
revenge upon the peoples they had been told had despoiled them of their
place in the world'. In these and similar statements, Bernard thus
introduced psychological and cultural factors absent from the work of Davis
and Parmelee (Bernard 1972: 87, 335-36, 380).
Bernard also worked actively to offset the consequences of fascism for
the ocial sciences in Europe. At the 1937 meeting of the ASS he supported
a motion by Maurice Parmelee that would have blocked affiliation with the
International Federation of Sociological Societies, an organization
dominated by the French International Institute of Sociology, then (or
soon to be) subject to fascist influences.'2 As editor of the American
Sociologist, a publication he launched after resigning from the ASS in the
late 1930s, Bernard invited comment from fellow sociologists concerning
the role of refugee intellectuals. The e refugees were welcome, Harry
Elmer Barnes intoned in a lead article in the American Sociologist, o long as
they 'expose the methods of fascism, not flirt with them' (Barnes
1944: 1-2).
Linking fascism to a narrow and sterile positivism, Bernard also
anticipated the idealist-positivist argument then taking shape in the work of
Marcuse and others. His particular focus was the 'fascist' sympathies that
allegedly motivated the sociological elite who formed the core of the
Sociological Re earch Association, an invitation-only club organized in
1936, from which Bernard had been excluded. Its members - which he
termed 'particularistic mystical sociologists' - included two quite different
types. One wing denied any regularity in human affairs, and hence the
pos ibility of social control through science. 'Many, perhaps most of the
sociological mystics are Fasci t at heart, and, when they can overcome their
repugnance to the espousal of a cause, are so in fact,' he wrote. In their
view, ociology was 'a mere esthetic exercise', the univer itic 'a natural
product of human tupidity, made to serve the function of providing them
with income and intellectual amusement'. A second type of mystic
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inhabited the house of science itself: 'he often regards himself as a
statistical methodologist (and indeed does frequently play with numbers
and equations and with fact gathering)' (Bernard 1940: 340-50).
In the early 1940s Bernard sharpened this attack in the pages of the
Aml'Tican Sociol.ogi.sl. In one draft editorial - initially titled 'Lillie Sociologist,
What Now?' - he summed up his case in especially vitriolic terms.ss The
SRA, having 'drawn ridicule' for the 'poverty' of its research and the
'mediocrity' of its candidates for election, now proposed to secure its grip
on the ASS by creating different categories of members (a proposal at the
1941 meetings). This report would be accepted 'by the "Heil Hitlers" of the
Society'. So bitter were his feeling that he temporarily succumbed to an
adole cent temptation to jibe at the Society's initial - ASS. The result
would be the domination of the Society by the SRA's 'fascistic machine'.s 4
Although Bernard's friends persuaded him to delete the reference to
the 'Heil Hitlers', the charge contained a point worth exploring seriously:
idealism and empiricism, although philosophically oppo ed, boiled down
lo the same thing. Denying a natural order, the 'sociological mystics'
despaired of reintroducing order in 'this world of chaos' other than
through the imposition of an external 'dictator', ju t as the 'theologically
minded had earlier turned to "priestly hierarchies"'. The worship of 'fact'
led down the same path. Coming from a positivist, the charge against
ideali m was nothing new. What distinguished it now was the related
allegation that the trouble was with po itivism itself. 'Strange bedfellows
indeed!' Bernard commented, thinking again of the cosy alliances within
the SRA (Bernard 1940: 343).
Whatever their merits, however, Bernard's fulminations diluted
principle with provincial prejudice and professional politics even more
obviously than was the ca e with most of his colleagues. Although he did
not finally agree with isolationists concerning the coming and conduct of
the war, he shared their anti-Briti h animus, seeing British and German
imperialism as the twin devils in international affairs, and fearing a
resurgence of fascism in Briti h clothing with war's end (Bernard 1943a:
1-2; 1943b: 1-2). Domestically, as the reference to effete democracies
suggested, his own version of democracy was something other than that
actually practised in Britain, France, and the United States - in fact closer
Lo a populist authoritarianism than he cared to admit.
Professional infighting also muddied devotion to pure principle. In the
battle over affiliation with the International Sociological Society, ongoing
feuds within the ASS (especially over the SRA), even perks in the form of
~he appointment of delegates, reinforced lines drawn over isolationism,
mtcrnationalism, and the Nazi menace. On the issue of refugee
~o~iologists, concern over their pro-fascist leaning (as in Barnes's anicle)
JOmed considerations based on job security and often-parochial
nationalism.s.5 Whether or not some members of the SRA were actually soft
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on fascism (Ogburn among them), Bernard provided no particular_s.
Although his 'fasci t' name-calling may be excused as the ort of hyperbolic
excess in which American often indulge, it also expressed his personal
pique at being excluded from the sociological establishment, effectively
trivializing the European reality.
Mor over, it was not at all clear that Bernard had more to offer than
thos sociologi ts who in i ted on a rigid separation of science and society,
mean and ends. Although he had a chance to clarify his position in War
and ils Gau es (1944), the work was a curious one from som one who for
several years had b en hurling the epithet 'fascism' at members of his own
profe sion. At the conceptual I vet his analysis combined a conspiracy
theory of 'big busin ss' (the American per nnial) with a personal
in lination to ee the world in terms of manipulation, revenge, and the
que t for individual advantage and prestige - a view he buttressed with
appeal to an already hopworn behaviourist psychology. Thus Hitler sought
to play the hero, military men sought lo t prestige, and an industrial elite
sought economic advantage while bamboozling a vengeful German public.
B rnard' taxonomic method meanwhile blunted those criticisms of
fascism he made, as he organized causes of war in a series of pigeon-holes
(psychological, geopolitical, cultural, etc.) into which he placed historical
exampl . Thu Nazism as a manifestation of nationalism or religious
fervour wa effectively equated with any and all xpression of these
sentim nt , pa t or present. 'If this book were readable, it would be
dangcrou ', a Harvard historian wrote concerning the latter point. By
putting aggressor and d fenders on the same level, 'no war appears
profitabl and no cau e good': not the Civil War, not the war again t the
Axis. Ultimately, he concluded, the fault lay not with Bernard, but the
th:~st of modern 'objective' scholar hip. Three decades later, another
critic put the matter more bluntly: 'But why doesn't he al o say simply, War
is hell?' (Fox 1944: 4, 16; Charny 1972: 7).
Wha~ever the shortcomings of the analysis, Bernard and the other
acad mic radical nonetheless de erve credit for speaking out, especially
wh 11 compared with the attitud s of I ading proponents of a more strictly
valu~-neutral ociology. During the war years, The American Sociolngi.sl
pro id d a continuing guide to the latest books on fasci m while insisting
that ociol
.
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issue that continues to be debated (Bernard 1945: 1-2).!6 At the same time,
the factors that kept Bernard and his allies from pushing their analyses
further also explain why they too were less effective than they might have
been in mobilizing opinion against fascism within and outside the
profession. Politically, their leftist views, coupled in varying degrees with
enthusiasm for the Soviet Union, made them automatically suspect.
However energizing their animus against American 'big business', their
insistence on this theme to the exclusion of a genuinely sociological
analysis revealed more about the American past than the German or Italian
present. The absence of such analy is, in turn, revealed the interwar
isolation of American sociology from its European roots (indeed a general
animus against theory altogether). Nor were these political convictions
(and, as it will turn out, anti-Semitism) unrelated to thi theoretical
orientation since both ultimately reflected a crisis within a provincial,
culturally impoverished, segment of American Protestant culture from the
1910s onward.'7
ABOVE THE BATTLE
William F. Ogburn

Although Bernard never named the 'fascists' in the SRA, he and his
associates regularly referred to the 'T-0-R' faction that con trolled AS
affairs by the mid 1930s - the 'O' in this unholy Trinity being William
Fielding Ogburn (1886-1959), probably the most prominent and
influential of the proponents of 'scientific' sociology within the
profession.~ Born and educated in the South, Ogburn had done his
graduate work under Franklin Giddings at Columbia, and in 1912 earned
his Ph.D. for a stati tical study of child labour legislation. In Social Change
(1922), he introduced the phrase 'cultural lag' into the sociologists'
vocabulary. During the 1920s, he represented the discipline at the Social
Science Re earch Council, and was soon a power in the world of foundation
politics. ln 1927 he joined the faculty at the University of Chicago, later
chairing the sociology department. Ogburn's pioneering study oflhe 1928
election earned him a minor footnote in hi tories of quantitative social
science (Ogburn 1929-1930; Easthope 1974: 114-19, 133-34, 145-46;
Maus 1962: 136-38; Gow 1985: 1-18). As research director of President
Herbert Hoover's Committee on Social Trends, he played a pivotal role in
producing the pathbreaking Recent Social Trends (1931). During the
depression years, he served on several New Deal agencies.'9
Despite a lifelong penchant for travel to exotic places, Ogburn early
developed a distrust of Europe and things European. During a visit to Paris
in 1906, his first trip out of Georgia, he was repulsed by his discovery of a
bohemian world of 'Russians, poets, artists.Jews' ('But nearly all queer', he
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confided to his diary). During the Fir t World War, he saw firsthand
evidence of wartime hysteria in the activities of his Columbia mentor,
Franklin Giddings, whose pro-war excesses provided many younger
sociologists with a powerful lesson of what sociology should not be (Gruber
1975: 60-1, 85-6). Attracted to socialism, he toyed first with the economic
explanations of Louis Boudin 's Socialism and lhe War (1916) before setlling
into profound disillusionment at the outcome in the postwar era.
Ogburn's programme for sociology, as outlined in his presidential
address before the ASS in 1929, was uncompromising. Sociology was 'not
interested' in improving the world, he told his colleagues. 'Science is
interested directly in one thing only, to wit, discovering new knowledge.'
This goal required a 'wholly colorles literary style' and a rigorous method,
preferably statistical. The truly scientific sociologist, a service intellectual
rather than a policy maker, would not pretend to 'guide the course of
evolution', but rather would generate the 'information necessary for such
supreme direction to some sterling executive who will appear to do the
actual guiding'. The enemy was 'emotion': the goals 'efficiency' and
'adjustment' (Ogburn 1930).
Although Ogburn's nthusiasm for this vision gradually eroded during
the 1930 , his devotion to it shaped his reaction to fasci m. As a matter of
principle, he tried to avoid statements on public issues entirely. When
circumstances forced him to discuss fascism, his references were brief and
muted. For example, in Soriolog;y (1940), a textbook written with Meyer
Nimkoff, Ogburn included one three-page discussion of fascism and a
second brief mention of totalitarianism, both treated within the context of
economic organization, social efficiency, and 'different systems of
interrelation of state and industry'. A 'new type of government',
totalitarianism posed 'a challenge to democracy', the authors told students.
But too much could be made of the differences between the two systems.
'The propaganda regarding democracies and totalitarian states serves to
exaggerate the difference .'Ju t as fascism in Germany and Italy was largely
a product of war preparations, o 'many of the characteri tics u ually
associated with totalitarian ocietie are found in the democratic states in
wartime'. Would the totalitarian states evolve toward democracy?
Answering this question, Ogburn equivocated, concluding with a homily on
the need to balance freedom and organization (Ogburn and Nimkoff 1940:
765,651,654).
Meanwhile, Ogburn learned that such detachment had its price.
Attending a talk on German propaganda by the head of the Berlin
A sociated Press Bureau in mid 1942, he was curiously torn. 'The questions
and hi ·tories related chiefly to the interferences of the Nazis with liberty
and to their brutalities', he wrote in hi diary. He had 'listened with great
admiration at the skill and efficiency' of the German propaganda machine
('not admiration of course for the end, but for the means'), a manipulation
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of opinion that seemed to him not much different from what any family or
college fraternity does to its members. Others in the audience, however,
'seemed to listen with contempt, disgust and horror at the domination and
the interference with the liberty of the press and the di tortion of fact' .
While they were consumed by hate, he assumed that atrocities 'were a
function of war, instead of being a correlate of one side', he conLinued,
reverting to the language of stati tics. 'As the discussion progres ed, I felt
alone, a though no one thought the same way I thought.' Was he
'psychotic?' Was he 'in any way abnormal?' No, he decided. But he disliked
seeing his colleagues 'so emotional and so hating' .40
When it came to explaining Nazism, or America's motives in fighting th
war, Ogburn fell back on an economic analysis more extreme than that
offered by the ASS radicals. Attending a talk on the cause of the war a
month later, he rejected the speakers' contention that the Allies fought for
'human dignity'. If so, why were those who cared about human dignity not
at war all the time? Why not fight at home for the rights of minorities? And
weren't the Germans fighting for their own ' human dignity' which suffer d
so badly after Versailles? As a motive, 'human dignity' would not do, he
decided. 'The desire for material resource and economic advantages plus
a tradition for national glory' better explained the issue for both sides.
Even at that, he still wondered why the United tales was in the war at all
since the nation's economic motive was at best in the form of fears for the
future. 41
On V-E day, Ogburn looked back over the troubled years. 'Now that the
war is over, I may say that I have felt lonely during the war with no per on
that J knew with whom I could talk.' His position, as he now reviewed it, was
probably not unlike that of many isolationists and 'America Firsters'. He
had 'always wanted us to win'. But the victory had been at great costs,
hatred and passion being among them. The root of his difficulty was merely
· (a) certain detachment and (b) an ability to see the other fellow's side'.
From this Olympian perspective, even Hitler was but 'a symbol to stimulate
and arou e the masses'. In yet another entry he complained that it was
impossible to say any 'kind words' about Hitler without being ostracized.
What 'kind words' he had in mind, he did not specify. 42
A year later Ogburn learned the full cost of his detachment. 'The
consensus expressed about you was that your professional career . . . has
been seriously marred and your reputation injured by your non-belief in
democracy and your obsession with [and] your fondness and admiration
for totalitarian dictatorships', a former sn1dent wrote to him in I 946 after
overhearing him thus criticized during a conference held at Princeton.
'Your friends cited the fact that you seemed to be pro-Nazi in the late 1930 ,
even up to Pearl Harbor. They now say you are just as trongly in favor of
the Soviets, and that you evidently adhere to a totalitarian form of
government.' She was al o not comforted when another friend defended
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Ogburn, aying he was reported as pro-Nazi 'merely because of the absurd
notion you had that you could view objectively a war in which the world was
involved, and remain neutral'. 4 '
The irony in all this was that Ogburn by this lime was assailed on all side .
To Harry Elmer Barnes, he seemed the prime example of the 'flipflopping
and backflipping liberals' who favoured peace in the 1930s but supported
war when 'Frankie [Barnes' and Lundberg's preferred name for President
Franklin D. Roosevelt) slipped'. 44 The FBI, in turn, suspected Ogburn of
being soft on Communism, a suspicion that led them to keep track of his
activities until close to his death. The resulting file -which one investigator
has recently examined under the Freedom of Information Act - hows no
evidence of any association with right-wing groups, but rather involvement
(u ually very meagre) with organizations designated as Communist or
Communist fronts, among them the Association of Scientific Workers from
about 1938 to 1945, the Spanish Aid CommitLee in 1941, and the Veterans
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, also in 1941.◄s
Ogburn, accordingly, was troubled by this student's report. 'It jerked me
up quick', he confided to his diary. But, as his other entries indicated, he
was not entirely blameless. He did admire order and efficiency; he did
distrust emotion deeply, even when directed against an Adolf Hitler. Nor,
given a lifetime of training, was Ogburn able or willing to remove the cloud
in hi postwar writing . Debating the merits of freedom versus organization,
he continued to insist that the question was one of relative merits rather
than absolute values. 'Thus the war impo ed some re trictions on all ofus',
albeit that in Nazi Germany 'the curtailment of liberty was general'. In a
passing reference, he used Goebbels' work as minister of propaganda as
evidence of the misuse of knowledge, but left his own judgement in the
form of a question: 'who shall say he used such knowledge for the good of
society?' (Ogburn 1948: 256; 1949: 208).
George A. Lundberg

During the early 1940s, the defence of value-neutral sociology fell to a new
generation, and with it the problem of responding to fascism during
wartime. Among these stalwart , few were more outspoken, or more
colourful, than George A. Lundberg ( I 895-1966) of Bennington College,
and, after 1945, the University of Washington. Although never enjoying
Ogburn 's prestige, Lundberg exerted greater influence within the
profession than his academic positions might sugge t: as author of
Foundations of Sociology ( 1941) and Can Science Save Us~ (1947); as president
of the ASS for 1943; and a chief exponent of what he termed
'operalionali m'.
Lundberg's troubles with fascism began in the late 1930s, at first almost
as a joke. '1 know you are quite Fascist in speech, but I imagine you wouldn't
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like it if you had to live under it - because you dearly Jove your "inalienable
right" to shoot off your mouth,' his friend Read Bain of Miami University
wrote in March 1937. To this Lundberg replied: 'Whence came this idea
that I "am quite Fascist in speech"? I hate the bastard as much as any
Hebrew.' Still bantering, the sociable Bain confessed a year later that such
talk was not making him very popular. 'I have already been run out of 2 or
3 households almost for saying that I believe I could get along in Nazi
Germany as a sdentist, about as well as here - some better. If I got into
trouble it would be becau e I stuck my neck out, i.e. tried to play a part in
policy making, and value promoting - instead of doing my stuff - find out
what is.' 46

In the end, however, it was Lundberg's attitudes toward fasci m, rather
than Bain's, that caused the greatest controversy. Born in Fairdale, North
Dakota, the son of Swedish immigrants, Lundberg sought in 'science' a
security and respectability missing during his youth. Since there were no
high schools in his area, his education consisted of a college preparatory
course from a Chicago correspondence chool, and a degree in education
at the University of North Dakota. From there it was an appointment as
superintendent of schools in a place called Hope, North Dakota ( 1920), an
M.A. under E.A. Ross at the University of Wisconsin (1922), and a Ph.D. at
Minnesota (1925) under Bernard and F. Stuart Chapin.
A fifteen-month interruption to erve in the First World War shaped
Lundberg's attitudes toward politics and world affairs more or less for life.
'I e caped most of the irritations, indignities, and absurdities of the military
routine', he later wrote with characteristic hauteur, 'and felt more than
adequately repaid for the inconvenience by a three months' period of study
at the London School of Economics'. Whatever patriotism he felt yielded
quickly to the post-Versailles disillusionment. To the end of his days, he
remained a foe of internationalism in all its forms.
Were his convictions not problem enough, Lundberg had a way of
putting things that was offensive or amusing, depending upon one's point
of view. Despite his self-professed love of the people, his statements
concerning democracy and dictatorship seemed to many to be pro-fascist,
as his exchange with Bain attested. Although on that occasion Lundberg
denied the charge ('I am not for a damn thing but Roosevelt at present,
and share his views fully in democracy'), he proceeded to dig him elf in
even deeper. Sure, he liked ridiculing 'the communists' criticism of fascism
- most ofit is idiotic'. Further, he wasn't 'at all sure that the Italians aren't
as well off as they would have been under any other regime'. And the
Germans? 'Somebody had to repudiate the treaty etc., etc. And if Hitler
should take back some of his colonies, it might help the world situation, if
it wasn't too expensive.' As for 'the freedom of speech tufT, as he termed
it: 'how important is it to those who have nothing to say, i.e. about 99%'.
Since such freedoms were a 'correlate or function of the security of a
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regime', one could expect their gradual return once the new rulers were
firmly in the saddle.
From 1939 to 1941, with war raging in Europe, Lundberg supported
i olationism and such America Firsters as the aviator Charles Lindberg. In
public he could be biting enough. But in private he was even worse. While
visiting the sociologi t Roderick D. McKenzie at the University of Michigan
in the late spring of 1940 - as Jessie Bernard heard the story - he boasted
that he 'had enjoyed [the war] and grown fat on it', a statement particularly
offensive to Mrs McKenzie who had lost a brother in the war. For
'intellectuals' he had nothing but contempt. He hoped to do an article on
their 'stupid behavior ... in the face of the war', he wrote to Jessie Bernard
that same July. 'I'd like to accu e them of selfishly looking after what they
think is their own interest- a vested interest in talk - and selling the masses
of the people in every country down the river by inducing them to fight for
symbols which aren't worth fighting for, except for journali ts, preachers
and professors, who live by them. ' 47
Nor did the war change Lundberg's mind. In Can Science Save Us? (1947),
originally lecture at the University ofWashington in the spring of 1945, he
repeat d the message, although this time without any reference to fascism.
Lundberg's message was vintage positivism, coupled with a lament that
social scientists get no respect. Without benefit of a scientific approach, the
postwar settlement wa doomed to go the way of the disastrous Versailles
settlement of two decades before, Lundberg warned. Although he never
defined the term 'science', his model was essentially that of the engineer or
technician, ·tre sing method and results over theory and truth. Scientific
statements, so conceived, had a similar formulation whether dealing with
disease or social problems: 'if you want this, 'then' do that. Statements of
any other sort- whether political, ethical, or aesthetic - were not scientific
even when uttered by scientists. Social scientists often form pressure groups
to advance their preferences. But neither the likes, the dislikes, nor the
organizations were thus scientific (Lundberg 1947: 27-33).
By this time, Lundberg's views were taking a toll on his reputation. In
September 1940, Jessie Bernard warned that his anti-war entiments,
Olympian objectivity, and apparent disdain of democracy were harming
him professionally. 'It has occurred to me ... that in the past decade or so
you have allowed yourself to become a bit too removed from the ordinary
human values', she wrote to her old friend. 'Are you not a bit too
Olympian? pontifical? unsympathetic?' Others soon seconded the
comment. 'Positivistic sociology had its origin in a con ervative and
reactionary mission, and this function characterizes it even today', another
critic charg d in the wake of his presidential address to the ASS, citing
Marcu e among other . Lundberg's 'advocacy of the isolation of science
from ociety, and a contempt for democracy' together illustrated the
'pro to-fascist aspect of positivism'. Years later,Jessie Bernard repeated her
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earlier warning. 'I know you are not a fascist; at least you never were. But
your theories are definitely fascistic in implication' (Hartung 1944). 48
Perhaps even worse, Lundberg had discredited all sociologists when it
came to government service, another student of Luther Bernard wrote to
him once the war was over. 'I would say in the late emergency ... I saw no
evidence of any practitioner of sociology (of either the scientific or intuitive
school) being in any policy making or agency role as a sodologist,' he
continued. 'Being a sociologist was a positive disadvantage in acquiring a
strategic position in government and you are not wholly without blame. ' 49
New departures

That interest in empirical research and a high level of professionalism need
not necessarily breed indifference to fascism was demonstrated by two
apparent exceptions lo the Olympian detachment of Ogburn, Lundberg,
and others: Clifford Kirkpatrick's Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life
( 1938); and Theodore Abel's Why Hitler Came Into Power ( 1938).
Contemporaries of Lundberg, and representatives of American sociology's
third generation, both men moved in circles where cienlific detachment
was at a premium. An undergraduate at Clark (B.A. 1920), Kirkpatrick (b.
1898) received his doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania (1925), and
later taught at the University of Minne ota ( 1930-49), a bastion of positivist
sociology. Abel (b. 1896), in turn, received both an M.A. (1925) and
Ph.D.(1939) at Columbia where he taught from 1929 until his appointment
at Hunter College in 1951.
Yet, in other respects, their backgrounds and experiences differed
significantly from Lundberg's. While Lundberg first sat out, then regretted
the First World War, Kirkpatrick won a Distinguished Service Cross for
service in the Army Ambulance Corps. Before going to Minne ota, he
moved through a series of elite eastern schools, Andover and Brown (where
he taught 1920-21 and 1923-24 respectively), in addition to Clark and
Penn. Abel, a Pole by birth, served in the Polish army during the First World
War before coming to the United States, living his entire life in New York,
New Mexico, and Indiana. Steeped in European social theory, he published
his first book on Systemalic Sodology in Gennany ( 1929).
In their studies of fascism, Abel and Kirkpatrick employed empirical
technique , setting their works apart from many imilar efforts. Awarded a
Guggenheim for 1936-37, Kirkpatrick conducted extensive interviews in
Germany, many with National Socialists. In addition, he consulted a wide
range of German newspapers and other relevant publications. Abel, more
ingeniously, devised a contest wherein Nazi party members could win four
hundred marks in prizes for essay on their life histories. The enterprise
yielded some 683 manuscripts, a number of which he reprinted verbatim in
a final section of his study.
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What distinguished their works, however, was a new theoretical
sophistication that for the first time approached a genuinely sociological
interpretation. National Socialism, argued Kirkpatrick, was more than the
product of leadership. terrorism, class struggle and monopoly capitalism,
or militarism - although each played a part. Viewed sociologically,
Germany was rather 'an experiment in regression to tribal-group intimacy
on a national scale by means of modern agencies of communication'.
Initially, modern tran portation and communication disrupt primarygroup intimacy, he continued, employing a distinction between primary
and secondary, in- and out-group going back to Charles Horton Cooley,
William Graham Sumner, and their European mentors. But these same
forces also facilitate attempts to revitalize this community on a national
scale, a 'tribal engineering' with modem propaganda techniques. Since
confu ions concerning family life and woman's place were a central
element in this dislocation, sociological analysis provided the key to the
Nazi programme for women, no less than to National Socialism generally.
Abel, targeting psychoanalytic and Marxian theories in particular, also
opposed simplistic, monolithic explanations. Rather, a complex
interaction of discontent, a flexible ideology, organization and
propaganda, and charismatic leader hip brought Hitler lo power, he
argued in an analysis that drew on Weber's conception of charisma
(Kirkpatrick 1938: Ch. 1; Abel 1938: Chs. 6-8; Abel 1945).
Both Kirkpatrick and Abel also stated explicitly that careful scholarship
did not require detachment or disinterest. 'The writer has no illusions
about his capacity for purely objective description,' Kirkpatrick confessed.
'In political outlook, he is liberal in the sense that he values reason,
toleration and co-operation.' He was also a 'hedonist' and thus disliked any
system that made people manifestly unhappy. To understand all was 11.ot to
forgive all, Abel ob erved, challenging Mme de Stael on this point. In later
years, he returned to Germany to record exit interviews with concentration
camp inmates (Kirkpatrick 1938: xi-xii). 56
But was the conflict beLWeen scholarship and commitment, medium and
mes age thus finally resolved? Had the shadow that objectivism shed over
analy es of fascism been dispelled? Despite their personal revulsion to
Nazism, and the merits of their analyses, neither the authors nor their
reviewers answered these questions very satisfactorily. Having disagreed
with de Stael, Abel added somewhat enigmatically: 'I therefore declare
myself willing to bear the accusation of impartiality, but plead "not guilty"
to a charge of intended approval or disapproval of the movement' (Abel
1938: 9).s1 Apologies aside, Kirkpatrick al o left no doubt that he intended
a 'scientific' study. Indeed, in a variation of a dilemma many social scientists
have faced, he regretted that many Nazis he had interviewed would view a
'scientific analysis' of their movement as a 'betrayal of friendship and
ingratitude for hospitality' (Kirkpatrick 1938: xii).
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Reviewers applauded their detachment, rather lhan I.heir convictions.
'The author will doubtless be attacked in these hysterical Limes for his
impartiality', Kirkpatrick himself wrote of Abel. 'From the standpointoflhe
sociologist I.hat is an achievement.' While he had put down most such
books 'because the authors have obviously written with their glands rather
than I.heir brains', added a reviewer of Nazi Germany, 'not so Kirkpatrick, for
this book is a model of tireless sifting of evidence, patient inquiry, testing
of interpretations, and scientific detachment' (Kirkpatrick 1939; Waller
1940). Sophisticated analysis, it appeared, did not resolve the dilemma of
advocacy and objectivity.
OBJECTIVISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

By the early 1940s, mounting evidence of Hitler's 'final solution' convinced
some obsen•ers that anti-Semitism was not merely an incidental appendage
but integral lo the psychodynamics of German fascism. Although the full
story of how and why Americans resisted acting upon this knowledge is too
complex to be detailed here, one factor was certainly a long, convoluted
tradition of anti-Semitism that strengthened during the interwar years as
sons and daughters of prewar Jewish immigrants took their place in
American society. For the leading objectivists, hints of anti-Semitism (or
something very close) reinforced a principled neutrality concerning
fascism. 52 Within academia, and the professions generally, discrimination
against Jews in the interwar years ranged from outright exclusion to
admission quotas to more subtle 'understandings'. Nor were the ocial
sciences immune. 'Another possibility is Louis Wirth at Tulane', W.F.
Ogburn wrote to a friend at Smith in 1930. 'He has a very keen mind. He is
a Jew, however.' Even more bluntly, Read Bain wrote to the sociologist
Samuel Stouffer at the University of Chicago in 1936 that he wanted to hire
'a bright, young, non:Jewish, non-Negro male under lhirty' - a remark that
deeply offended Wirth and cau ed Stouffer to beg Bain for an apology. 5s At
Harvard a few years later, one administrator explained patiently to Talcott
Parsons why no Jew should be appointed at their institution, reasoning
circularly that their own economics department had a difficult enough
time placing their graduate student Paul Samuelson. 54
Objectivism contributed to this status quo, however subtly and
indirectly, in that it took conventional stereotypes as 'data' for analysis.
Perhaps most striking was the case of William Ogburn. A radical of sorts
during his younger years, Ogburn by his own later testimony had spent
'great gobs of tim 'during his years at Columbia in the l 920s helping Jews
obtain jobs and fellowships. But his altitude gradually soured. Their
'aggression, ego, contempt, etc.' got under his skin, he later confided to his
diary. Invited to dinner parties, he would wonder 'if Mr._, a Jew, would
be there, or Prof. _ , a Jew was invited. If so, I braced myself for a bad
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time.' Finally, he asked him elf'why I have to be o damned nice to the Jews
if I do not enjoy them'. At the same time, he realized how unjust it was to
endow · the individual with the traits of the race' .55
Faced with this dilemma, a nineteenth-century liberal ideally might have
reread John Locke on 'natural rights', or quoted the Declaration of
Independence. Ogburn instead made a list. Comparing thirty-five Jew he
had known at Columbia and at Chicago with a random list of thirty-five
non-Jews, he scored each group for ten to fifteen objectionable traits often
attributed to Jews. The result showed that 85 per cent of the Jews had the
traits, but only 15 per cent of the non-Jews. 'So I declared my independence
of my conscience about the Jews', he concluded this tortured diary entry.
'And I am not "nice", to those I don't like, no matter how much I
sympathize, or how well I understand how they got that way. ' 56
Since Ogburn left liltle record of his activities before and during the war,
the results of this diary 'declaration' may never be fully known. The irony
was that this objectivist exercise, in an important sense, violated his basic
inslincts, then and later. The letter for Wirth, a po itive recommendation,
was itself concrete evidence of h_is efforts on behalf of Jewish colleagues.
When compiling his list of 'objectionable traits', he did not consult his own
feelings, but rath r asked his secretary, who was a Jew, what it was the
Anglo-Saxons did not like aboutJews. Ogbum's son later recalled that his
father's social life and friendships included many Jews, and remembered
nothing derogatory said about Jews in hi home (Fielding Ogburn to
author, 18 Octob r 1991). A few diary entries aside, Ogburn was otherwise
silent on the subject. But it is the silence, in the face of Nazi atrocities, that
is finally the problem.
Just as curious in its way was Bernard's War and its Causes. Since his wife
Jessie was born a Jew, Bernard had discussed the i sue of Jewish culture
often and pa sionatcly for two decades. Jessie herself had recently
contributed to a ymposium on the nature and causes of anti-Semitism.
Bernard thus ought to have been more sensitive to the issue than were
many of his colleagu s. Yet in these discus ion with his wife, Bernard
himself betrayed a d ep ambivalence toward Jews and Jewish culture,
which, if not anti-Semitic, sometimes came awfully clo e. 57 Coupled with his
other convictions - animus toward all religion, populi t re entment of big
busine s - this ambivalence now translated into complete silence
concerning Hitler's treatment of the Jews.
Although Ogburn confined hi remarks to his diary, and Bernard took
refuge in silence, George Lundberg was characteristically outspoken. Like
Ogburn, Lundberg was never crudely anti-Semitic, and might even claim to
oppo c discrimination again tJews. But his way of talking about them left
doubts. 'I am breakfasting with two-of the fairest Bennington Hebrews', he
wrote to Bain in late 1936, adding: 'They have insisted on meeting me at
the train with Lhe family limou ine - I wouldn't get out to meet Jesus Christ
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at a Chicago station al such an hour of the morning.' Equally ambivalent
was his comment to Bain thal he haled the Nazi 'bastards as much as any
Hebrew'.
As translated in his presidential speech to the ASS in 1943, this
ambivalence caused a public furore. Although the subject was 'Sociologists
and the Peace', Lundberg lost no time getting to religion, the source of
those moral and ethical views that had consistently frustrated true social
science. A 'minor illustration', he noted, were 'large numbers of organized
and articulate Jews in their unhappy predicament devoting themselves to
legalistic and moralistic conjurings so that their attention is entirely
diverted from a realistic approach. They demand legislation prohibiting
criticism and they demand international action outlawing anti-Semiti m,
instead of reckoning with the causes of the antagoni m'. These 'firebrands'
would probably attack his remarks as anti-Semitic, he concluded this
lengthy harangue. But this fact merely showed 'how a primitive, moralistic,
theological, legalistic attitude obstructs a scientific approach'.
As it happened, Lundberg did not have to wait. 'I am compelled to
report', he later wrote of the reception, that the talk 'was interrupted with
some hisses and boos - not a usual recognition at this annual occasion'. In
fact, he had not seen such 'an accolade' in thirty years of attending
scholarly meetings! When the address was published, others continued to
wonder. 'Have you read Lundberg's presidential address?' Parmelee wrote
to Bernard the following spring. 'It has raised the question whether he is
anti-semitic, although he protests against it' (Larsen 1968: 21) .ss
For the next decade, Lundberg continued a running battle with
prominent Jewish leaders and organizations, all the while claiming that he
was really on their side. The more he protested, however, the more you
wondered. The Council for Judaism are loud in their praises for my views
and apparently regard me as a second Moses called to lead the Chosen
People out of the Wilderness', he wrote to his close friend Harry Elmer
Barnes at tl1e height of this controversy. 'If this continues, I expect to be
eligible for honorary circumcision by the time commencement roles [sic]
around, or what does one get for high achievement among the Hebrews?' 59
Anti-5emitism (partially) reconsidered

Such attitudes notwith tanding, some sociologists by the early 1940s were
beginning to explore the deeper dimensions of Jewish-Gentile relations,
past and pre en t. A notable effort was Jews in a Gentile Worl.d (1942), a
collection of essays edited by one Isacque Graeber, a
sociologist/ethnologist formerly at the University of Paris, and Steuart H.
Britt, a ometime lawyer and assi tant professor of psychology at George
Washington University. Although the editors clearly intended the work to
aid the Jewish cause in the developing crisis, they insisted that theirs was a
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book in which 'experts from a number of fields ... examine the problems
of anti-Semiti m in a dispassionate, objective manner'. Contributors were
to include a number of non:Jewish scholars ('in the interest of tact and
effectiveness', the editor wrote to one contributor) (Graeber and Britt
1942: v-viii). In the end, eight sociologists joined nine other contributors,
making the volume the most sustained address of the situation ofJews and
the nature of anti-Semitism by sociologists to date.
Their contributions included the worst and the best in the collection.
Arguably the worst was a survey of 'Anti-Semitism through History' in which
Joyce 0. Hertzler of the University of Nebraska appeared to argue that the
solution to the problem of anti-Semitism was nothing less than the
elimination of the Jew as Jew. Among the better was Jessie Bernard's 'An
Analysis of Jewish Culture'. Although she too blamed Jews as well as
non-Jews for the long history of anti-Semitism, she argued for modification
of conflicting cultural traits on both sides. Probably the best, certainly the
most sophisticated conceptually, was Talcott Parsons's 'The Sociology of
Modern An ti-Semitism', the first of several analyses of fascism he published
during the early 1940s. In these articles, Parsons raised analysis of fascism
to a new level and in the process eventually established a new paradigm for
the discipline.
ENTER TALCOTT PARSONS

Born at the turn of the century, Talcott Parsons (1902-1977), like
Lundberg, represented a third generation in American sociology. Unlike
his objectivist contemporaries, however, he was early exposed to a wide
range of American and European social theory, first as an undergraduate
at Amherst (1924), then at the London School of Economics (1924-25)
and Heidelberg ( 1927). 60 In The Stmcture ofSocial Action ( 1937) he provided
the synthesis of Weber, Durkheim, and Pareto that secured his reputation
and later influence. This work, in turn, provided the framework for several
studies of the professions in modern society (Parsons 1937 and 1939) and,
indirectly, of anti-Semi ti m and fascism.
Fascism, Parsons insisted, was a distinctly new phenomenon on the world
scene - a 'radicalism of the right'. Its 'radicalism' lay in the fact that it
inspired often fanatical zeal among the mass s of the people. Its character
as a movement of the 'right' derived from the role played in it by 'privileged
elite groups, groups with a ''vested interest" in their position'. The
combination was 'paradoxical', he continued, employing a favourile
catchword of post-Second World War liberalism. But the combination of
the two in the same movement - masses and elite -was 'the very es ·ence of
the phenomenon ... ' (Parsons 1942d: 124-25).
For his analy is, Parsons went directly to his European mentors: to
Durkheim for the concept of'anomie' to characterize the state ofinsecurity
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that made the masses amenable to extremist appeals; to Max Weber for the
notion of a 'process of rationalization' whereby scientific culture
challenged traditions of status, authority and privilege in the name of
equality and individual liberty, while at the same time creating an economic
order of capitalist free enterprise that threatened these values; and to
Vilfredo Pareto for the idea that the 'rationalistic scheme' of scientific
culture leads to an underestimation of the 'non-logical• aspects of human
behaviour, including 'the sentiments and traditions of family and informal
social relationships, of the refinements of social stratification, or the
peculiarities of regional, ethnic or national culture - perhaps above all of
religion'.
Since the process of rationalization affected social groups differentially
- professional and business groups leaning in the rational direction, for
example, and rural ones in the traditional- the result was not only inherent
'strains' within the social system, but social struggle. The 'uneven incidence
of ... emancipation' explained why certain marginal group within society
(women, youth, the lower middle classes) felt these tensions most acutely,
and hence were ripe for the appeals of fascism's radical traditionalism. In
a second article on the social strucntre of pre-Nazi Germany, Parson
described how and why the e social factor had combined to create a
seedbed for National Socialism (Par ·ons 1942a).
From this perspective, anti-Semitism was an integral part rather than an
incidental by-product of fascism. Again, Parsons's argument unfolded in a
series of interrelated proposition . For 'smooth functioning' a social system
requires 'a relative stability of expectations' and 'a sufficiently concrete and
stable system of symbols around which the sentiments of the individual can
crystallize'. Where social disorganization produces 'anomie' the disruption
of expectations and absence of suitable symbols lead to a generalized
aggression and insecurity. This 'free-floating' aggression then attache
itself to • ymbols only remotely connected with their original sources'. In
this situation, scapegoating characterizes public discourse. Since Jews are
most intimately involved in, and hence identified with, the spheres of
rationalized activity (business and the professions) that are furthest
removed from Gem£insrhaft patterns, 'they easily become target of the
fmstrations and aggression of those groups least touched by the ''process of
rationalization'". Thus, Parsons concluded his contribution to Jews in a
Gentile World, 'the most important source of virulent anti-Semitism is
probably the projection on the Jew, as a symbol, of free-floating aggression,
springing from insecurities and social disorganization' (Parsons 1942d:
125-26, 134; 1942a: 121).
Viewed in the light of European theories of fascism, most of this was
hardly new. Parsons's anomic mass man, consumed by 'free-floating
aggression•, stood in the tradiLion of Gustave Le Bon's The Crowd (1895),
Ortega y Gasset's The Revolt of the Masses (1932), and most recently, Emil
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Lederer's The State of the Masses (1940). even though Parsons cited only
Durkheim. 61 His notion of the differential impact of modernization
likewise echoed Karl Mannheim's analysis of the 'sphere of knowledge' of
different social group in Ideowgy and Utopia (1929, Eng. trans. 1936),
although Parsons did not mention any source other than Weber. 62
This is not to say that American sociology immediately embraced
Parsons's interpretation. Before Howard Odum accepted 'Some Sociological Aspects of Fascism' for Social Farces, Herbert Blumer turned it down
for the American journal ofSocwlogy, claiming that it was too long. 6' Between
1945 and 1960, the American Journal of Sociowgy, the American Sociowgi,cal
Review, and SodalForces together published fewer than a dozen articles even
nominally dealing with fascism or Nazism, none of them mentioning
Parson or developing a similar analysis. 64
But new questions had been asked, and the basis laid for a more
systematic understanding. Where fascism was concerned, Parsons had
moved American sociology to a new level of analysis. Gone were unrelated
generalizations concerning the logic of capitali m, the revolt of the lower
middle clas e , the strength of German nationalism, or the humiliation al
Versailles. In its place was a psycho- ociological explanation which anticipated similar arguments in American social cience and historical writing
for the next two decades.
As the 'frustration-aggression' model gained adherents, Parsons's brief
efforts were quickly eclip d by an outpouring of new studies of fascism and
anti-Semitism. Among the most prominent of these were Theodor W. Adorno
et aL, The Authoritarian Personality (1950), Hannah Arendt, The Origi,ns of
Totalitarianism (1951) and a growing number of studies by emigre social
scientists. In Political Man (1960), Seymour Martin Lipset (Ph.D. Columbia
1949) fused these interpretations - including Parson 's - into probably the
fullest account of fascism by an American-born sociologist to that date.
Without claiming too much for the psycho-sociological interpretations, or
attempting to analyse subsequent debates over theories of 'the authoritarian
personality' or mass ociety, one can say that Parsons's work thus marked a
turning point in American sociology's thinking about fascism.~
Parsonianism in practice

As the war approached, Parsons also took an active part in opposing
German totalitarianism - a public role that belie later images of him as an
abstract, 'grand' theori l. Warning that Nazi m threatened a return to the
'Dark Ages', he publicly opposed the 'appeasers' at the time of the Munich
conference in 1938. 'This war is not "just another European quabble" from
which we can remain aloof, he lectured, in effect answering the Ogburns
and Lundbergs. 'Our in titutions are in danger because a fight to the death
is already being waged against them. ' 66
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In Cambridge, Parsons helped establish the Harvard Defence
Committee, an organization formed to mobilize public opinion against
Nazism and for aid to Britain. Chairing its Morale and National Service
subcommittee, he gave numerous speeches (including one at a dramatic
campus meeting disrupted by isolationists), wrote frequent letters to
congressmen, and spoke often on local radio stations on behalf of
intervention. When the isolationist Harvard Student Union reque ted that
he excu e a class to participate in a peace demonstration in the pring of
1940, he refused on the basis both of his obligations to his students and of
his opposition to a 'peace' movement which, in his words, 'can only mean
peace at any price'. 'In the presentjuncture such agitation plays directly
into the hands of the Nazis;· he added. 'I can just hear Goebbels' chuckle,
as he hears of them. ' 67
So far as anti-Semitism was concerned, Parsons's frustration-aggression
model did not please everyone, as the editor offer.vs in a Gentile World soon
made clear, with respect to his contribution to that volume. In one of
several uncomfortable exchanges, one of the editors nagged Par ·ons about
the tone of his article. 'Mind you, none questions your sociological analysis,' he wrote, 'but merely the political effect of your conclusions upon the
public', since these conclusions would 'confirm the average Gentile in his
most complacent attitudes of snobbishness'. Among Parsons's sins were a
eemingly derogatory reference to Jews as a 'minority', an allegation that
Jews occupied the 'mo t conspicuous places' in German society and government in the Weimar years, and a characterization ofJewish sensitivity. 'On
the whole,' Graeber added, 'I find the aggression-frustration hYPothesis ... somewhat unsatisfactory. ' 68
Yet this flap told more about the editor's hypersensitivity, however
understandable in the face of events in 1940, than of anti-Semitism on
Parsons' side. In response to the complaints, he went out of his way to
placate the editor, qualifying the first and la t points in footnotes, and
replacing 'most conspicuous' with 'prominent'. Privately, he complained
to a friend that the editor was chopping and rewriting his prose to cut the
heart from his analysis. 69
More importantly, Parsons's later activities and associations had about
them none of the aroma of anti-Semitism that tinged the private and public
musings of some of the leading objectivists. Quite the opposite. In
subsequent writings, he continued to couple anti-Semitism and aggressive
nationalism as twin ills of modernization. 70 His many Jewish colleagues and
students consistently expressed nothing but gratitude for his efforts on
their behalf. During the McCarthy years, Parsons defended younger
colleagues, Jews and gentiles alike. Although the full story of Par on 's
opposition to Nazism, and his support for German sociologists, Jew and
gentile, Marxist and bourgeois, remains to be told, his record appears to
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have been one of firm opposition to bigotry and intolerance in all its
form .71
In the po twar years Parsons's sociological theory, itself steadily evolving,
served a political agenda that remains in contention. Just as the writings of
Ogburn, Lundberg, and others masked the programme of isolationists, British
bashers, and America Firstcrs, so Parsons's for a time supported the emerging
anti-Communism of the Cold War era. While their narrow economic interpretations were a pale echo of socialist or Marxist originals, and rooted deeply
in post-First World War revisionism, his analysis was anti-Marxist by design and
fervently anti-Stalinist in practice. While the concerns of Ogburn, Bernard and
others ranged from isolationism to anti-business populism, the Harvard
sociologi t spoke for an Ea tern internationalism now reconciled to po t-New
Deal, mixed economy, welfare capitalism.
To his critics, this Parsons of the 1940s-1950s appears a leading
proponent of an emerging 'corporate liberalism' and a Cold Warrior par
exteUence. 72 To his defenders, in contrast, his postwar activities seem a
natural extension of his earlier battJe against a11 form of totalitarianism.
Never an uncritical defender of 'capitalism', they argue, Parsons distinguished in theory between 'capitali m' as a socio-economic phenomenon
and the economic rationality and market mechanisms that were equally
important for the operation of socialist economies. In practice, he sought
a middle way between orthodox laissez faire capitalism and Marxian
socialism. His vigorous oppo ition to Stalinism in the late 1940s, no mere
'Cold War hysteria', proceeded directly from his crusade against Nazism.
When McCarthyism threatened to deny free speech and civil liberties, he
opposed it with equal vigour. From this perspective, the recent
dc-Stalinization of Ea tern Europe suggests that Parsons was once again
more right than wrong. 75
Recently this debate has focused on Parsons's activities in securing
Ru ian experts among former German co11aborators in the late 1940s, a
final chapter in his wartime activities. Writing in the Nation in March 1989,
the historian Jon Wiener argued that Parsons's agenda did not preclude
cooperation with ex-Nazis in the name of anti-Communism once the Cold
War was underway. During the summer of 1948, with the Communist
takeover of Czechoslovakia already a fact, Parsons travelled to Germany to
recruit Soviet and East rn European specialists for Harvard's Russian
Research Center (RRC), a group closely associated with US intelligence
agencies. Among the scholars whom Parsons allegedly met and recruited
was one Nicholas Poppe, a language pecialist from the University of
Leningrad. Poppe's wartime assistance to the SS extermination programme
made him an embarrassment to authorities in the British zone of Germany
(where he resided) and had convinced the US State Department to deny
him a visa. Although aware of these facts (although probably not the SS
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connection), Parsons allegedly sought Poppe a Harvard appointment until
continued opposition led him to the University of Washington. Parsons's
other a1leged ex-Nazi contacts that summer included a Kiev professor who
had worked with the German propaganda ministry, and a former Red Army
lieutenant-colonel who became chief of security of a pro-Nazi Committee
for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. Sought as war criminals by the
Soviets, these individuals presumably had a personal stake in exaggerating
the Russian menace to the Stale Department or to anyone else who would
listen. 'By materially assisting in this intelligence process,' Wiener concluded, 'Talcott Parsons contributed to some of the most antidemocratic
and anti-intellectual trends in post-war American political life.' 74
In a significant challenge to this account, Jens K. Niel en, a Dani h
scholar trained at Yale, has raised important questions of fact and
interpretation. For one thing, Parsons, so the evidence suggests, never met
or spoke with Poppe. For another, it was the Harvard anthropologist Clyde
Kluckholm, not Parsons, who initiated efforts to recruit Poppe for the RRC
(after convincing himself on the basis of careful enquiry that Poppe had
committed no war crimes). More importantly, in all these efforts, one must
distinguish between Parsons's personal role and motives and the activities
of the RRC in which he was an active but econdary actor. 75
The background and beliefs of the 'pro-Nazis' whom Parsons allegedly
contacted during the summer of 1948 also demand a do er look, Nielsen
continues. Most if not all were in fact members of a so-called 'Vlasov group'
(after Russian Lieutenant-General Andrey A. Vlasov), a left-oriented,
nationalist faction of Rus ian army dissidents who hoped to overthrow
Stalin by allying with Germany. Closely connected with anti-Nazi groups in
the Germany Army and German intelligence (one of its most eager
promoters in Germany was the officer who planted a bomb in Hitler's
headquarters in 1944), they were German collaborators but not pro-Nazi.
Although Nazi leaders saw the value of the Vlasov movement for
propaganda purposes, they consistently humiliated its members. Vlasov
himself was held in semi-captivity in Germany throughout the war and was
once called by Himmler 'a pig'. A 'Vlasov army' that existed briefly in 1945
was best remembered for a fight against SS units in Prague, and, in any case,
was in no position to commit war crimes. Toward the end of the war, they
spoke of establishing democracy in a so-called 'Prague Manifesto'. 76
Making this case, Nici en is appropriately cautious. Parsons was fully
aware that Harvard's RRC was closely integrated with governmental
intelligence, an arrangement which, however justified under the
circumstances, raises important questions about the appropriate role of the
university in society. Future historians may conclude that Poppe was indeed
guilty of war crimes (even though his supporters vehemently deny the
allegation). The Vlasov group' eleventh-hour enthu ·iasm for 'democracy'
may have been for allied consumption, since its authoritarian tendencies
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generally eclipsed its libertarian ones. Although not rabidly anti-Semitic,
some of its leaders shared the anti-Semitism endemic in Russian ociety.
But in matters of such moral moment as war crimes, Nielsen concludes,
getting the facts straight becomes a pecial obligation.
Whatever the full truth turn out to be concerning Popp (or, more
specifically, RRC knowledge of his past), the nature and aims ofVlasov and
his followers, and Parson '· role on the RRC (and Nielsen's ca eon each
point appears compelling), Par ons by the early 1950s was a clear winner
on th ociological battlefront. For Ogburn and Lundberg, debates over
fa cism brought osten ible damage to reputation, while his became a major
voice within American sociology and po twar American liberali m.
CONCLUSION

What, then, should be the final judgement of American sociology's
re ·pon e to fascism? For emigrc intellectuals such as Hans Gerth, a well as
for a younger generation of radicals in the 1960s, the answer later seemed
clear, a the respon e to fascism became something ofa bellwether Lo those
who attacked the 'value-free' ideal. Lamenting the emergence of this
'sci ntific ethos', G rth in particular noted that the American Journal of
Sociology published only two articl on National Sociali m fr m 1933 to
1947, one, his own account of Nazi 1 adership, accepted only 'after the hot
war was underway' ( Gerth 1959: 7-14).
For Gerth, the explanation lay in the increasing pecialization of the
discipline and the emphasis on ever-narrower 'empirical' studies. While
agre ing in part, thi e say suggests both modification and extension of the
argument. For one thing, Gerth 's view under ·tates the opposition voiced by
Ellwood, the many lesser-knowns who wrote articles and reviewed books on
fascism in the sociological journal·, and by the Bernard dissidents, however
superficial and unheeded their analy is. For another, Gerth's emphasis on
developments within sociology ignores the relation between ociological
theory , nd the profe ional and political pre ures that haped debate. As
ociology profcs ionalized, a rising cult of scientific objectivity inhibited
public statements on public issue while at the same time marginalizing
those mo t inclined to speak out against developments in Europe.
Intellectually, the treatment of fascism during the 1930 · and 1940s revealed
the continuing isolation of American sociology from European social
theori t (Marx, Weber, and Freud among others), an isolation that grew
more marked as a econd and third generation of American sociologists,
unlike the founder , ought their training at home. Compounding this
myopia were parochial concern derived from the American experience
during th progres ive era, pecifically the tradition of opposition to 'big
busine s', i olationism in international affairs, and anti-Semiti m, however
veiled or convoluted.
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The combined results could be seen in simplistic economic
explanations that obscured the revolutionary nature of fascism a
combining a racial pathology with the latest in cience and technology; and
in a behaviouristic psychology that focused attention on propaganda
techniques rather than the psychodynamics of the fascist appeal.
Final1y, in blurring differences between the 'value-free ideal' as
preached and pracli ed by such interwar objectivists as Ogburn and the
theories and activities of Talcott Parsons, Gerth 's analysis ob cures both the
breakthrough in Parsons's writing on fascism and the extent of his public
opposition to it before and during the war. In the process, it al o obscure
the role of fascism, in shaping, if only indirectly, a fundamental
reorientation of the discipline in the postwar years.
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William F. Ogburn, Diary, May 8, 1947, William F. Ogburn Papers, University of
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This statement is based on the absence of any mention or the ubject in Fred H.
Manhews (1977) and Wayne D. Brazil (1975). The latter deals with Odum's
career only through the early 1930s.

206

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS AND FASCISM, 1930-1950

12 Charles A. Ellwood, 'Sociological Life', Luther Bernard Papers, University of
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allow treatment of his views here, see especially his Society in Transition (1939).
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208-23).
21 Davis [autobiography), BPUC.
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25 On Parmelee, see Don C. Gibbons (1974).
26 Maurice Parmelee to Luther Bernard, October 21, 1933, BPPS.
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40 William F. Ogburn, Diary,Jnne 22, 1942, WFO.
41 Ibid.,July 10, 1942, WFO.
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[hereafter RB).
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48 Jessie Bernard to Lundberg, April 22, 1949, CAL. See also Behice Boran (1947).
49 Bruce Melvin to George Lundberg, December 17, 1945, CAL.
50 Information concerning still unanaly·ed camp interviews from Stephen Turner
to author, September 10, 1989.
51 To this statement, an anonymous reader years later pencilled a large question
mark in the margin, adding 'What the fuck??' Marginalia in copy in
Swarthmore College Library.
52 On growing American awareness of the plight of European Jewry, and the
nation's shamefully tardy response to the Holocaust, see Arthur D. Morse
(1968), Henry Feingold (1970), and David S. Wyman (1968 and 1984).
53 Read Bain to Sam Stouffer, October 17, 1936, RB.
54 Edwin B. Wilson to Talcott Parsons, May 12, 1939, Talcott Parsons Papers,
Harvard [hereafter TP).
55 Ogburn, 'Journal', March 15, HMS, WFO.
56 Ibid.
57 For an extended treatment of this theme, see Bannister (1991 ).
58 Maurice Parmelee to Luther Bernard, May 25, 1944, BPPS.
59 Lundberg to Barnes, February 22, 1949, CAL. The Lundberg papers contain
ex1en ive correspondence on this issue.
60 On Parsons's early life, see Peter Hamilton (1983:Ch. 3).
61 On this traclition, see Gregor (1974:Ch. 4).
62 This point is suggested in De Felice (1977:87).
63 Herbert Blumer to Talcott Parsons,July 6, 1942, TP.
64 One exception among sociologists was David Riesman ( 1942). Although
Riesman did not cite his future Harvard colleague, Parsons, his analysis was
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time'. When Riesman returned to the topic in the early 1950s it was within the
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to conflate fascism and Soviet Communism. See Riesman (1964).
For a useful di cu ion of recent thinking see G. Eley (1983).
Par ons, 'New Dark Ages Seen if Nazis Should Win·, Boston Evening Transcript,
September 28, 1938. I am indebted to Stephen Turner for bringing this piece
to my attention . For perceptive comments on an earlier version of this ·ection,
I also wish Lo thank Dr Victor Meyer Lidz, Division of Addiction Research and
Treatment, Department of Mental Health Science, Hahnemann University. Dr
Lidz, of course, bears no re ponsibility for any remaining errors of fact or
interpretation. In particular, I am unable to addre sin the space available some
important differences between Par ons's statements concerning Nazism in an
advocacy role and in a more strictly theoretical context, or the originality ofhi
analyses of Gem1an social structure when compared with sociologi ts before
and after, including Hannah Arendt.
Talcou Par ons to Alan Gottlieb, April 16, 1940, quoted in Jens Kaalhauge
Nielsen, 'The Political O1ien1ation of Talcott Par ons: The econd World War
and Its Aftermath', in Talcott Parsons: Theorist of Modernity, (eds) Roland
Robertson and Bryan S. Turner, London, Sage Publications, 1991. I am
indebted to thi analy is for much information in this section, and to Jens
Nielsen for sharing his findings in greater detail in a phone conversation with
the author, November 14, I 991.
I. Graeber to Talcott Parsons, February 19, 1940, TP.
Parsons to Ben Halpem ,June 26, 1942, TP.
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Structure of the We tern World', Psychiatry 1947, vol. 10, p. 179.
Victor M. Lidz LO the author, October 20, 1991; Nielsen, 'Political Orientation',
p. 225.
William Buxton, Talcott Parsons and the Capitalist Nation-State, Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1985, especially pp. 97-101.
Niel en, 'Political Orientation', p. 225.
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pp. 304 ff. , which draws heavily on the unpublished doctoral dissertation
( UCLA) of Charles O'Connell, and on Christopher Simpson, Blowback:
Americas &rruil111ml of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War, New York, Weidenfeld
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' Political Orientation', pp. 220-24.
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